University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Cornhusker Economics

Agricultural Economics Department

2014

Nebraska: Asymmetric Information in Crop
Insurance
Cory Walters
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, cwalters7@unl.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/agecon_cornhusker
Walters, Cory, "Nebraska: Asymmetric Information in Crop Insurance" (2014). Cornhusker Economics. 689.
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/agecon_cornhusker/689

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Agricultural Economics Department at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cornhusker Economics by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska Lincoln.

Cornhusker
Economics

September 25, 2014
Institute of Agriculture & Natural Resources
Department of Agricultural Economics
http://agecon.unl.edu/cornhuskereconomics
Follow us on Twitter and Facebook @UNLAgEcon

University of Nebraska–Lincoln Extension

Nebraska: Asymmetric Information in Crop Insurance
Market Report
Livestock and Products,
Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. .
Choice Boxed Beef,
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
Carcass, Negotiated. . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, Ch. & Pr., Heavy,
Wooled, South Dakota, Direct. . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Crops,
Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
Nebraska City, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
Nebraska City, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feed
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales,
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good
Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
⃰ No Market

Year
Ago

4 Wks
Ago

9/19/14

125.23

152.66

158.42

183.84

258.48

276.25

161.01

226.79

235.53

192.94

251.96

246.23

94.94

95.81

104.66

97.80

106.58

110.50

125.18

157.88

162.88

280.82

364.00

368.21

6.59

5.58

4.75

4.86

3.49

3.12

13.15

12.52

10.57

7.34

6.09

5.21

3.34

3.95

3.79

192.50

191.25

140.00

100.00

90.00

132.50

87.50

87.50

215.75

97.50

118.00

75.25

38.00

35.00

*

Increasingly agricultural policy has turned from direct counter-cyclical commodity programs toward
social insurance and risk management programs.
Congress attempted to entice producer participation
in the crop insurance program by increasing premium subsidies and introduction of new crop insurance contracts through the Agricultural Reform Act
of 1994 and the Agricultural Risk Protection Act of
2000. Higher subsidies and expanded contract options helped fuel an increase in insured acreage.
Insured acres increased from 100 million to 265
million between 1994 and 2009 (USDA-RMA Bulletin). Also, during this timeframe other undesired
outcomes may have emerged. Subsidized and complex crop insurance programs may increase the likelihood that profit-maximizing producers can use
information advantages to garner returns above
what the government intends. The excess returns
would result in increased costs to taxpayers and potentially inefficient reallocations of resources in agriculture.
The root of inefficiency in insurance lies in asymmetric information. These inefficiencies are generally subsumed under the categories of adverse selection (or anti-selection) (Akerlof 1970) or moral
hazard (Arrow 1985), or both. An example of adverse selection would be the purchase of crop insurance (provision) where the insured has information
unknown to the insurer, and so can obtain excess
expected returns. Essentially, the insured is using
loaded dice, and the insurer does not know it. Moral hazard occurs when participants change their
(risky) actions when insured – for example, by
adopting more risky inputs or crop regimes. In agri-
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culture the boundary between choosing to participate
in insurance programs versus altering management
practices because of participation can be ambiguous - since often the insurance provision decision and
the operational production decisions occur simultaneously. Hence, it is often difficult to distinguish
empirically between adverse selection and moral
hazard (Quiggin, Karagiannis, and Stanton 1993). In
this study, we were not concerned about the category
of behavior (i.e., adverse selection or moral hazard),
but only whether and to what degree such actions
occur.
Hence, we use the generic term
“opportunism” and “opportunistic behavior” to indicate either or both forms of (rational, profitmaximizing, but inefficient) behavior under information asymmetry.

by producer, amount of subsidy, crop type, number of acres, field practice, coverage level, unit
type, insurance type, year, county location of unit,
and type of APH (actual and/or T-yields). We
conducted our analysis using data for five different growing regions, two with relatively homogenous within-county land resources (Iowa and
Western Nebraska) and three with more heterogeneous land resources (Oklahoma, North-Central
Montana, and Eastern Washington). To permit an
examination of the effects of the heterogeneity of
land resources, we limited our data sample to nonirrigated agricultural production. Even with the
limited number of regions and considering only
non-irrigated production, the data set includes a
total of 392,035 observations.

To address several issues faced by insurance program
designers and administrators, we empirically examined some recent crop insurance experience. We examined whether insurance contract characteristics
stray from the neutral revenue impacts one would
expect from actuarially neutral insurance (i.e., with
premium rates set to cover expected costs under
complete information) beyond the impact of subsidies and, if so, by how much. We looked for evidence of such deviation by examining returns to particular features of insurance. If variation in unit-level
crop insurance returns (other than the subsidy) is systematically associated with insurance contract characteristics or with geographic region for a representative time period, then either the insurance is not actuarially neutral or the subsidy is not implemented according to policy. Either case would permit participants to exploit opportunities within the insurance
system to make profits, e.g., by exploiting contracts
that are too cheap relative to those that would emerge
under neutral insurance. We investigated whether
producers using different insurance contracts
(including buy-up coverage, unit type, revenue insurance, and T-yield) may have strategic advantages in
their contract selection.

We conducted our analysis using data for five different growing regions, two with relatively homogenous within-county land resources (Iowa and
Western Nebraska) and three with more heterogeneous land resources (Oklahoma, North-Central
Montana, and Eastern Washington). To permit an
examination of the effects of the heterogeneity of
land resources, we limited our data sample to nonirrigated agricultural production. Even with the
limited number of regions and considering only
non-irrigated production, the data set includes a
total of 392,035 observations.

Data
The data included observations of crop insurance
contract information and corresponding performance
records for all insured units by the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation ( FCIC) for each of 14 years –
1996 through 2009. Only insured units are included
in the data set. Producers can change insurance contracts on each unit from year to year. The data set
includes all information the FCIC has for each crop
insurance contract: indemnity amount, premium paid

Results
With space constraints I, as one of the authors, am
focusing only on results from Nebraska. Statistics
to examine the null hypothesis that producer selection of higher coverage levels (75% and greater), optional units, and revenue insurance did not
provide evidence of opportunistic behavior are
presented in Table 1. Significant positive marginal effects of coverage level by crop and practice
provide evidence of the exercise of opportunistic
behavior in an otherwise neutral insurance market
with the subsidy implemented consistent with policy. In Nebraska the percent of positive coverage
level marginal effects that were significant at the
5% level was 15%. The average magnitude was
$16 per acre with a maximum of $72 per acre and
minimum of $4 per acre. The average magnitude
exceeded the average indemnity ($8 per acre) over
the study period. There was no evidence of opportunistic behavior in the optional unit and revenue insurance selection in Nebraska. Nebraska
demonstrated evidence of opportunistic behavior
from the use of T-yields. Nebraska had 7% of

Table 1. Significant and Positive Marginal Effect Estimates for Crop Insurance
Contract Decisions

Significant Positive Marginal
Effects (5% level)

Nebraska
Coverage
Level

Optional
Unit

T-yields

Revenue
Insurance

Number significant

9

0

4

0

Percent of higher coverage
level marginal effects significant

15

0

7

0

Average value ($/acre)

15.54

0.00

2.70

0.00

Maximum value ($/acre)

71.66

0.00

6.73

0.00

Minimum value ($/acre)

3.82

0.00

1.32

0.00

significant positive T-yield marginal effects. The average, maximum and minimum values of these marginal
effects were lower than for higher coverage level selection. Findings suggest that the potential exists for
producers to profit by selecting higher coverage levels
and/or by the advantageous use of T-yields.
Reducing producer opportunism would create a more
cost-efficient risk management program that would
limit the ability of producers to extract net profits from
participation beyond the intentional subsidy provided
to induce higher rates of participation. In Nebraska
two of the four decision categories demonstrated evidence of significant producer opportunism. The exceptions were the use of T-yields and the decision to
purchase revenue insurance. Relative to average indemnities, the magnitudes were often quite large.
Opportunism was judged through an assessment of
subsidy-adjusted net profits since actuarially neutral
insurance with no asymmetric information

should produce zero profits beyond the intentional
subsidy used to induce participation. Given an
efficiency goal, our finding suggests that an increase in rates for higher coverage levels and a
restructuring of the T-yield system is warranted to
decrease the effect of producer opportunism.
However, the results do not support the hypothesis
that producers profit by selecting revenue insurance (and optional units in Nebraska), nor that
high levels of government “incompetence” exist in
the design and administration of the crop insurance system.
The manuscript was printed in the Journal of A pplied Economics Perspectives and Policy and can
be found here http://aepp.oxfordjournals.org/ For
questions about the manuscript please contact
Cory Walters at cwalters7@unl.edu
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